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| An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts | 
 enlarge | Authors: Ines Macho-stadler, J. David Perez-castrillo
Creator: Richard Watt
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Category: Book
List Price: $50.00
Buy New: $38.03
You Save: $11.97 (24%)
New (19) Used (6) from $33.25
Avg. Customer Rating:  2 reviews
Media: Paperback
Edition: 2
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 304
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.1 x 0.7
ISBN: 0199243255
Dewey Decimal Number: 658
EAN: 9780199243259
Publication Date: May 17, 2001
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Condition: Over 4 million customers served. Order now. Selling books online since 1995. Order with confidence. Code: L20090103044654I
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| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
Graduate-level textbook covering the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party is better-informed than the other in a business relationship. Also includes introductory material and a model in which both parties have the same information throughout the relationship. Softcover.
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| Customer Reviews:
Economics of Information February 17, 2008
Few books are concerned with this subject. Ines Macho-Stadler and David Perez-Castrillo were able to explain in a intuitive and structural way the problems derived from asymmetric information. This book guides you along the way to understand clearly the features of this themes.
Information to the reader: this book is good April 11, 2000
21 out of 21 found this review helpful
In less than three hundred pages, the authors are able to introduce Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Signalling in an outstanding accessible way. Given the importance of contract theory in modern Economics, undoubtedely this is the first book to be read.
Each chapter is full of examples and graphs that help to understand the mathematics underneath.
The reader is supposed to know Kuhn-Tucker theorem, so any advanced undergraduate student in economics should be able to read it.
The base model, presented in chapter 2, is used as a benchmark to compare wirh the results obtained from the Moral Hazard model (brilliantly presented in chapter 3), Adverse Selection (chapter 4) and Signalling (chapter 5).
Each chapter has very well posed exercises, whose answers are in the end of the book. Furthermore, advanced themes are also discussed in the end of each chapter, giving to the reader a complete overview about theory of information.
So, since this theme has been increasingly important in modern economics, and given that this book is very easily readable, I strongly recommend it to any person who wishes to understand theory of contracts and incetives.
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