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| | The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm |  | Authors: Robert F. Bruner, Sean D. Carr
Publisher: Wiley
Category: Book
List Price: $16.95
Buy New: $11.53
You Save: $5.42 (32%)
Avg. Customer Rating:  34 reviews
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 272
ISBN: 0470452587
Dewey Decimal Number: 332
EAN: 9780470452585
Publication Date: April 27, 2009 (In 108 Days)
Shipping: Eligible for Super Saver Shipping
Availability: Not yet published
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Product Description
"Before reading The Panic of 1907, the year 1907 seemed like a long time ago and a different world. The authors, however, bring this story alive in a fast-moving book, and the reader sees how events of that time are very relevant for today's financial world. In spite of all of our advances, including a stronger monetary system and modern tools for managing risk, Bruner and Carr help us understand that we are not immune to a future crisis."
—Dwight B. Crane, Baker Foundation Professor, Harvard Business School "Bruner and Carr provide a thorough, masterly, and highly readable account of the 1907 crisis and its management by the great private banker J. P. Morgan. Congress heeded the lessons of 1907, launching the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to prevent banking panics and foster financial stability. We still have financial problems. But because of 1907 and Morgan, a century later we have a respected central bank as well as greater confidence in our money and our banks than our great-grandparents had in theirs."
—Richard Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of the History of Financial Institutions and Markets, and Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University "A fascinating portrayal of the events and personalities of the crisis and panic of 1907. Lessons learned and parallels to the present have great relevance. Crises and panics are as much a part of our future as our past."
—John Strangfeld, Vice Chairman, Prudential Financial "Who would have thought that a hundred years after the Panic of 1907 so much remained to be written about it? Bruner and Carr break significant new ground because they are willing to do the heavy lifting of combing through massive archival material to identify and weave together important facts. Their book will be of interest not only to banking theorists and financial historians, but also to business school and economics students, for its rare ability to teach so clearly why and how a panic unfolds."
—Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial Institutions, Columbia University, Graduate School of Business
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| Customer Reviews: Read 29 more reviews...
 Disappointed, but it is not terrible January 2, 2009
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
Gotta say I am surprised on this one. After reading the reviews I bought the book, and started off pretty saddened with the content.
There is no history to the crisis, and by all accounts the authors seem to figure it was triggered by the SF earthquake, but without any context or data it is hard to trust their logic at all. Then, about 30 pages in, the good part begins, but it tells a story, not per se a case study. The story is well crafted and moves right along, taking you through 2 months in late 1907. This continues for 100 pages, and then the story ends and the authors go off drawing conclusions as to what happened and why, with no context whatsoever. And I have to say, one reason for the crash they list is that financial markets are complex. Really? If I had submitted this as a paper in college, my professors would have made me re-write it.
I guess to put it into today's terms, it would be like trying to determine why Merrill Lynch failed in the fall of 2008 by starting with the failure of Bear Sterns in the spring of 2008. There is a fair bit of history that should be communicated probably starting in 1996 onwards. This book looks only at a very short time frame.
If you want to read a nice story of this sort, "The Great Crash of 1929" or "Reminiscences of a Stock Operator" would be much better purchases. If you already read both of those, then go for this one, but it will not be as good.
If you are looking for a detailed study as to why the panic of 1907 happened, this is not the book.
 Very timely book December 31, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
The financial industry has always been inter-linked, and this book clearly shows that systemic risk is nothing new. While the book is interesting, it often seems to dwell on minutia, and at other times fails to connect the dots to give the reader the "big picture". For instance, the international flow of gold during the crisis is discussed in numerous segments of the book, yet there is no discussion of the gold standard and what if any impact it had.
You can see what happens in a crisis of this nature with no Federal Reserve. Men like Morgan, sensing the danger, lead the financial industry through the crisis, while the President does little more than follow his lead. Sound familiar?
 An Overpriced, Short, Shallow "Book" December 24, 2008
2 out of 4 found this review helpful
I read with interest the glowing reviews of this book so I bought it. Was I ever disappointed. I have not attended business school, but it appears that this "book" may be the basis of a "case study" in business school (I think the author's slipped at the end when they just about say as much on page 152, "Any single case study, such as the one we have presented here...") The "chapters" are so brief you can read two or three of them while waiting in line for a cup of coffee, and they basically amount to this: (1) a great financial calamity occurred; (2) JP Morgan said "I'll fix it", and (3) he did. The next chapter is (1) another great financial calamity occurred; (2) JP Morgan said "I'll fix it", and (3) he did. Repeat till you get to the end of this extremely short "book" (which is 178 pages, excluding notes.) I have nothing against JP Morgan, mind you, and have read some excellent books about him--as can you, if you buy something else. For what it's worth, I would have given the book two stars instead of only one but for the fact that the authors (academics with grand titles, no less--check out the book's back flap) are apparently accustomed to charging outrageous prices for what they force their B-School students to buy. The price of this book--even with Amazon's outstanding discount--leaves it vastly overpriced. There are no new lessons here, nothing you can't figure out yourself, and nothing worth the price.
 Interesting perspective November 28, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
While the book certainly has some weaknesses, it is still a remarkable and readable one, providing very interesting perspectives on credit crises.
A Very Easy Read November 20, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Most people reading books on finance, particularly historical books, aren't really expecting something highly readable by a layman. That is where this book is quite surprising. It flows very nicely and quickly. It visualizes events of the day very well. To be clear, this book focuses quite closely on the events immediately preceeding, leading up to and mostly during the crisis in October-November 1907. Some discussion is done of the aftermath and results but it really focuses and puts you in the meeting rooms with the people making the decisions at the time they were happening. Some space is given to the aftermath and addressing the causes but it really does a spectacular job of actually walking through the events that occurred as they were perceived. What is thought provoking is how eerily similar some attributes of this moment in history are to today. Particularly as Bruner and Carr walk you through the cascade of one institution disintegrating after another and as the events unfold to cascade wider and wider in scope. What exacerbated the events of the day, liquidity evaporating, is very much what is driving and exacerbating more recent events. The authors do seem a touch fond of J.P. Morgan and how he handled the crisis and do focus quite a bit on this. However, the facts are what they are. Had there been no J.P. Morgan to step in, one wonders how differently things may have unfolded. This book is highly readable and flows quite smoothly and quickly and is very enlightening.
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